Five years after the collapse of Football Index, customers are still fighting to get their money back, as campaigners seek a fresh government review of the circumstances surrounding the platform\u2019s failure and the regulatory decisions that preceded it.<\/p>\n
David Hammel, head of the Football Index Action Group (FIAG), has written to Minister for Gambling Vicky Foxcroft requesting a meeting to present evidence he argues raises further questions about the handling of the platform by the Gambling Commission and the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA).<\/p>\n
In his letter, Hammel asks the government to reconsider the position adopted by previous ministers, arguing that the independent review led by Malcolm Sheehan KC did not examine several issues now central to the campaign for compensation.<\/p>\n
He writes: \u201cI am writing to congratulate you on your appointment as Minister for Gambling, and to request a meeting regarding the collapse of Football Index (BetIndex Limited) and the ongoing failure to address its consequences for the thousands of customers affected.\u201d<\/p>\n
Hammel says he has corresponded extensively with Foxcroft\u2019s predecessor, Baroness Twycross, over the past year. According to his letter, those exchanges repeatedly relied on the Sheehan Review and its implementation to conclude that the regulatory questions had been addressed and that there was no further prospect of redress.<\/p>\n
He is asking the new minister to examine the matter again, arguing that additional documents obtained since the collapse provide grounds for reconsideration.<\/p>\n
\u201cI would ask you to consider this matter afresh, considering evidence that was not before your predecessor in those terms,\u201d he writes.<\/p>\n
The renewed appeal comes as the consequences of the collapse remain unresolved for many customers who lost money on the online gambling platform. It also follows years of scrutiny over the company\u2019s business model, the way its products were presented to customers and whether the regulatory response was sufficient.<\/p>\n
The collapse that left customers facing substantial losses<\/strong><\/p>\n Launched in 2015 by Adam Cole and operated by BetIndex, Football Index presented itself as a football stock market. Users could buy and sell virtual shares in professional footballers, with potential returns linked to player performance and media attention.<\/p>\n The platform used terminology associated with financial markets, including shares, portfolios and dividends, although it operated as a gambling product. Its model attracted customers who believed they could generate returns by trading player shares and receiving dividend payments over time.<\/p>\n The business came under severe pressure on 5 March 2021, when it announced a substantial reduction in dividend payouts, reportedly cutting them by approximately 80%. The announcement undermined the assumptions on which many customers had based their trading decisions and triggered a sharp sell-off.<\/p>\n Some users reported portfolio losses of between 50% and 90%, although the impact varied according to individual holdings and trading activity.<\/p>\n On 11 March 2021, BetIndex announced that it was entering administration, and the Gambling Commission suspended the platform\u2019s operating licence.<\/p>\n The collapse left thousands of customers facing significant losses and uncertainty over whether their money could be recovered. Estimates of customer losses and funds tied up in the platform have varied, while the scale of the outstanding positions has remained a central part of the campaign for redress.<\/p>\n In his latest letter, Hammel refers to \u201cin excess of \u00a3124.5m in contracted positions at the March 2021 collapse\u201d. This figure concerns contracted positions and should not be treated as interchangeable with estimates of cash lost or the amount ultimately recoverable by customers.<\/p>\n For Hammel and FIAG, the financial scale of the failure makes the continuing absence of a compensation scheme particularly difficult to accept. The group argues that the consequences cannot be considered separately from the decisions made by the regulators responsible for overseeing the platform.<\/p>\n The Football Index Action Group challenges the Sheehan Review<\/strong><\/p>\n A central element of Hammel\u2019s campaign is the contention that the Sheehan Review, which examined the Gambling Commission\u2019s handling of Football Index, did not cover the full range of questions now being raised.<\/p>\n The review, led by Malcolm Sheehan KC and published in September 2021, examined the regulatory response to the collapse. Its findings prompted scrutiny of the Gambling Commission\u2019s oversight, including the handling of warning signs and the adequacy of its approach to the business.<\/p>\n However, Hammel argues that the review\u2019s terms of reference were too narrow to settle all the issues subsequently raised by FIAG.<\/p>\n His letter states that the review\u2019s cut-off date was 11 March 2021, meaning it did not examine the FCA\u2019s later classification decision concerning the platform. He also argues that the FCA\u2019s conduct was assessed against a narrower set of objectives than the Gambling Commission\u2019s.<\/p>\n According to Hammel, the review did not have a mandate to consider compensation, did not provide a formal route for affected customers to submit evidence and relied heavily on information supplied by the regulators whose conduct was under examination.<\/p>\n He further alleges that Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) and HM Treasury staff influenced aspects of the report\u2019s content and framing. These are claims advanced by Hammel and FIAG; they should not be presented as established findings without examination of the underlying correspondence and documents.<\/p>\n The group\u2019s argument is that the review has subsequently been treated as a definitive answer to questions it was not specifically designed to resolve.<\/p>\n In the letter, Hammel writes that previous correspondence \u201cconsistently relied on the Sheehan Review as having settled the relevant regulatory questions and justified the closure of any prospect of redress\u201d.<\/p>\n FIAG wants the government to distinguish between implementing recommendations intended to improve future regulation and determining whether customers affected by the collapse should receive compensation.<\/p>\n That distinction is fundamental to the group\u2019s campaign. Even if a review identifies failings and regulators subsequently change their procedures, customers do not automatically receive repayment of their losses.<\/p>\n Documents raise questions about early regulatory awareness<\/strong><\/p>\n Hammel\u2019s evidence also focuses on documents that FIAG says it has obtained through Freedom of Information disclosures, a Subject Access Request and other correspondence with the Gambling Commission.<\/p>\n He argues that some of these materials demonstrate that concerns about the nature of Football Index and its relationship with existing gambling regulations were raised years before the collapse.<\/p>\n Among the documents cited by the group is BetIndex\u2019s 2015 business plan. According to the evidence annex accompanying Hammel\u2019s letter, the plan described comparators as \u201cproducts treated, or nearly treated, as regulated financial instruments\u201d.<\/p>\n The annex also quotes the business plan as stating: \u201cthe principal barrier to entry for the business is most significantly gambling regulation\u201d.<\/p>\n FIAG further points to an independent test report dated 7 August 2015, which it says recorded features associated with the trading of shares rather than a conventional fixed-odds gambling product.<\/p>\n The report is quoted as stating: \u201cThe value of the shares is dependent on the amount of shares which have been purchased\u201d and \u201cThe player can decide to sell their shares at any time.\u201d<\/p>\n Hammel argues that these descriptions are significant because they suggest that demand-driven pricing and the ability to sell holdings were present from the platform\u2019s early development.<\/p>\n The evidence annex also cites correspondence from the Gambling Commission\u2019s Sports Betting Intelligence Unit in 2019, in which the platform was described as having the \u201cappearance of trading\/forex\u201d while the operator was attempting to present it as a betting product.<\/p>\n FIAG says this supports its contention that the distinction between gambling and financial trading was a known issue before the collapse.<\/p>\n The group also highlights concerns raised in a January 2020 report submitted by a competing operator. According to the annex, the document was titled \u201cFootball Index \u2013 \u00a3100m of customer money at high risk\u201d and warned about the platform\u2019s marketing, its exposure to a potential run on customer funds and the sustainability of its business model.<\/p>\n Hammel argues that these warnings should have prompted stronger intervention before March 2021.<\/p>\n The annex further refers to a Gambling Commission compliance assessment in May 2019 that identified concerns involving source-of-funds checks, suspicious-transaction reporting and problem-gambling alerts. FIAG says a follow-up assessment was agreed but not acted on for a further nine months.<\/p>\n The group also cites internal correspondence prepared after the collapse, including a comment questioning whether the product had been \u201cfalsely hyped to attract customers?\u201d<\/p>\n These excerpts form part of the case Hammel wants to put directly to ministers. Their significance, and what they establish about individual decisions, would require assessment against the full documentary record and responses from the relevant authorities.<\/p>\n Concerns over the trading platform and market maker<\/strong><\/p>\n A further strand of FIAG\u2019s evidence concerns the development of Football Index\u2019s trading infrastructure, including a market maker and technology referred to in the annex as Labsdaq.<\/p>\n Hammel argues that the platform\u2019s share-trading functionality created questions that went beyond the regulation of a conventional gambling product.<\/p>\n The evidence supplied by the group refers to internal Gambling Commission discussions about whether elements of the business fell outside the regulator\u2019s remit. It also cites correspondence from the Commission\u2019s Enforcement team that, according to Hammel, described buying and selling shares as \u201ca regulated activity\u201d and specifically as \u201ca contract for difference\u201d under the Financial Services and Markets Act.<\/p>\n FIAG says the Sheehan Review did not address this correspondence or examine several aspects of the platform\u2019s market-making arrangements and matching-engine technology.<\/p>\n The group has also raised concerns about the dual role of a market maker that could set reference prices while trading against customers. Hammel argues that these arrangements deserve further examination in the context of the platform\u2019s valuation methods and the potential for market manipulation.<\/p>\n These allegations are part of FIAG\u2019s broader argument that the product\u2019s financial characteristics were not adequately addressed. They have not, simply by being included in the group\u2019s evidence annex, been independently established as findings of misconduct.<\/p>\n The wider question for ministers is whether the material warrants further examination and whether it changes the basis on which the government has previously rejected calls for a compensation scheme.<\/p>\n A compensation claim and a March 2027 deadline<\/strong><\/p>\n Hammel\u2019s letter states that \u201ca funded regulatory negligence claim against the FCA and\/or the Gambling Commission is now being actively pursued in connection with these matters, with a limitation deadline in March 2027\u201d.<\/p>\n The proposed litigation adds urgency to the group\u2019s request for a meeting. It also means the questions raised by FIAG are not confined to a political campaign: they form part of a potential legal challenge concerning regulatory conduct and the losses suffered by customers.<\/p>\n The existence of a claim does not establish that negligence has occurred or that compensation will be awarded. Any legal outcome would depend on the evidence, the applicable law and the issues determined through the relevant process.<\/p>\n Nevertheless, the stated deadline gives the campaign a clear timeframe within which Hammel believes the outstanding questions need to be addressed.<\/p>\n He is also challenging the suggestion that liquidation remains a realistic route to meaningful recovery for customers.<\/p>\n According to his letter, the joint liquidators confirmed in August 2026 that only \u00a31.28m remained available for distribution, compared with almost \u00a312m held by BetIndex when it entered administration. Hammel says \u00a35.5m had been spent on liquidation and legal fees, including mediation with HMRC.<\/p>\n He argues that the costs and complexity of the process, combined with the number of creditors and the difficulty of valuing customer portfolios, mean that further payments to victims are unlikely.<\/p>\n The figures and the liquidators\u2019 position are cited in Hammel\u2019s correspondence and would need to be assessed against the underlying liquidation records. However, his central contention is that customers cannot reasonably be expected to rely on the administration process as a solution to losses of this scale.<\/p>\n Could the government establish a compensation scheme?<\/strong><\/p>\n FIAG is also asking the government to reconsider whether a dedicated redress scheme could be established, pointing to the collapse of London Capital & Finance (LCF) as a precedent.<\/p>\n In his letter, Hammel refers to a written statement made to Parliament on 19 April 2021 by John Glen, then Economic Secretary to the Treasury. According to Hammel, the statement confirmed that regulatory failings were a significant factor in the losses suffered by LCF investors, after which a compensation scheme was established.<\/p>\n He wants ministers to consider whether a comparable approach could be taken for Football Index customers, potentially using a modest allocation from regulatory fines paid by the FCA and Gambling Commission to HM Treasury.<\/p>\n The proposal would require careful consideration. LCF and Football Index involved different products, regulatory arrangements and legal circumstances, so the existence of a compensation scheme in one case does not automatically establish an entitlement to equivalent treatment in the other.<\/p>\n Any Football Index scheme would also need to address eligibility, the calculation of individual losses, the treatment of open positions and the source of funding.<\/p>\n However, Hammel argues that the government should not dismiss the idea without considering the additional evidence presented by the group.<\/p>\n For affected customers, the distinction between identifying regulatory problems and providing redress remains at the heart of the dispute. Reviews can lead to changes in regulatory practice, but those changes do not necessarily compensate people who have already lost money.<\/p>\n Five years on, the campaign continues<\/strong><\/p>\n In his letter, Hammel asks Foxcroft to meet with FIAG so that he can explain the evidence directly, rather than asking the minister to reach conclusions based solely on the accompanying documents.<\/p>\n He writes: \u201cI am not asking you to reach a view on these matters from the attached materials as there is much complexity; I am asking for the opportunity to present the evidence and explain its significance directly.\u201d<\/p>\n Hammel also says he has sent a similar letter to Lucy Rigby MP, the Economic Secretary to the Treasury, on 8 September, including an annex concerning the regulation of sports spread bets.<\/p>\n The request marks another attempt by the group to bring the compensation question back to the government, five years after the collapse first left customers facing substantial losses.<\/p>\n The Gambling Commission has previously stated that it does not have statutory powers to compensate Football Index customers and does not operate a compensation fund for this purpose. The government has also resisted using public funds to compensate customers following the failure of a private gambling business.<\/p>\n For campaigners, however, those positions do not resolve the questions they believe remain unanswered about the platform\u2019s regulation, the scope of the independent review and the prospects for legal redress.<\/p>\n The five-year anniversary is therefore more than a marker of the time that has passed since BetIndex entered administration. It highlights the continuing gap between investigating a corporate failure and providing a practical remedy for those affected by it.<\/p>\n Hammel and FIAG want ministers to consider whether the evidence they have gathered changes the case for further action, including a possible compensation scheme.<\/p>\n Whether the government agrees to reconsider its position remains a separate question from whether the allegations can ultimately be established. But for the customers still waiting for answers, the central issue remains the same: five years after Football Index collapsed, they are still fighting to get their money back.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Campaigners continue to challenge the regulatory decisions that left customers facing substantial losses<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":266702,"featured_media":2181536,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[137137],"coauthors":[127717],"class_list":["post-2181535","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-analysis","tag-top-story"],"yoast_head":"\n